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Prudent Planning for Space Operations
Owen E, Jensen, LI Colonel, USAF
[Note: 'The opinions contained in this article represent the views of 'the author, not of DOD 
or the U.S. Government]
This- paper has been developed, in four separate but interrelated parts. Each part could stand 
alone. Together, the four sections cover broad subject areas rather than focusing on narrow 
issues. These subject areas mutually affect, each other, however.. Taken together, they make a 
strong statement about certain directions 'for the USAF in space..
I. Planning for Conflict
The first, 'prerequisite to supporting warfighters from, space is to ensure that required space 
assets, will be available when they are needed. 'This, means first that they can be deployed to 
cower" any of conflict, and second that they can. survive long enough to perform their 
mission.
Given, the theme for 'this panel, there will undoubtedly be a number of calls for rapid 
response, survivable launch systems to support, a variety of Tacsat concepts. The underlying 
assumption behind these notions is that today's so-called peacetime systems are neither 
responsive nor survivable. Therefore* new1 systems - Tacsats - are needed, which would be 
designed, for respcmsiveiiess and sunrivability. Certainly, Tacsat. concepts are worth 
considering,, 'They have 'then* place in, a discussion of warfighting support. That does not 
mean, however, that such ideas, advocating sweeping changes in the present way of doing 
business, offer die 'Options;,
First, consider snrvivable launch. Why is it necessary? For pre-nuclear scenarios, both 
retain homeland,, sanctuaiy. Respective launch siles remain intact - with little need for 
smvivabifity. For scenarios calling for satellite replacement in. 'the midst of a nuclear exchange,, 
tie threat of cootiniiing ASAT attack (forcing 'Continued, launch of replacement satellites) is 
higjhly inqnobable. The following rationale applies:
Space threats which pose a physical danger to satellites ~ requiring their replacement - 
need a network of surveillance sensors to track orbital targets. These sensors would have 
to survive in oider to successfully prosecute .an attack with the required precision, Although 
future may be space- based, current sensors are commonly ground bas$d radars, each 
of wiici, would, be extremely difficult to protect Further, an integrated command and control 
would have to survive along with launch vehicles aid AS ATs themselves. Such, a list 
of intenslafed, ground based, vulnerabilities in a global nuclear scenario is simply too long, too 
fragile, and too uncertain for reliable nuclear war planning.
Of come, the nation nay still need to replace failed satellites a nuclear attack, 'This 
eills into question a trade in effectiveness between ofi-orbit spates sufficient to survive a, pie- 
nudear ASAT ofiilanght and post-nuclear survivable launch. So let us turn to that subject
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In dealing with questions of survivability, a primary assertion of this paper holds that it is 
currently safer to store satellites on orbit than on the ground. For example, on-orbit assets can 
be disguised, can be made maneuverable so as to frustrate an attack, and can use a number of 
other built-in survivability techniques (decoys, hardening, etc.) to avoid destruction. Low 
altitude satellites, however, are another matter. There may be no alternative to replacing them 
via responsive (versus survivable) launch systems if they are required for warfighting. This 
will be discussed later. Finally, ground spares for satellites could conceivably be stored in 
survivable locations and use survivable launch systems after nuclear attack. The need here is 
for a cost trade. This paper postulates, however, that development of a survivable launch 
infrastructure should not draw off precious funding unless we are forced to do so by direct 
enemy development of systems which obviate cost effective measures to build survivability 
into satellites.
Given the foreseen threat, adding increments of additional survivability to DOD satellites 
appears cheaper than building a survivable launch infrastructure. Our strategy should be to 
continue our baseline programs at prudent levels, invest in generic technology, watch our 
enemies, and change directions only if forced or if new opportunities arise. This conclusion 
becomes even more apparent as the primary threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union 
decreases under the impetus of sweeping political change on the other side of the Iron Curtain. 
In short, building a nuclear survivable launch infrastructure is simply not warranted at this 
time. Technology development for such capability, yes, but full scale development, no.
If Tacsats are not required for survivability, then, what about responsiveness? The answer 
is clear. Military space systems must become more responsive. Let us start with high altitude 
spacecraft.
As stated earlier, satellites at semi-synchronous and geosynchronous altitudes are relatively 
safe from attack, and use of on-orbit spares can compensate for premature peacetime failure. 
So today's highly capable assets and their evolutionary follow-ons at high altitude primarily 
require extremely economical, highly reliable launch systems in order to maintain robust 
constellations at affordable costs.
However, geosynchronous, equatorial satellite coverage is not necessarily global. Gaps at 
polar latitudes are particularly common. Nor do today's primary systems provide the dedicated 
service and system capacity to guarantee full support to a regional commander in conflict. In 
short, today's peacetime infrastructure could well require reinforcement — either for reasons of 
coverage or capacity — during periods of conflict.
Low altitude systems are vulnerable to attack. Use of on-orbit spares, if also stored at low 
altitude, may not be able to overcome attack attrition at cost-effective rates. For these systems, 
responsive replacement from the ground, using either Tacsats or satellites with increased built- 
in survivability, may provide the best answer.
Responsive launch would maintain low constellations at acceptable numbers during a 
prolonged attack, Survivable launch, however, would not be required because: 1.) AS AT will 
not continue to operate after loss of homeland sanctuary, and 2.) Constellations should remain
robust enough not to require post-nuclear strike replacement.
So, missions which are performed by both high and low altitude spacecraft would benefit
from responsive sparing from ground "'alert" during conventional conflict Certainly, nearly 
every recent study has concluded that responsive military space systems are needed, and their
absence is a shortfall in today's required capability. The open question remaining is whether 
such systems should be comprised of limited capability Tacsats or fully capable satellites. 
Trade i studies on this point are not conclusive.
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While answers to questions aie being sought, 'the main point of this paper stands* 
''WiitigliErs receive eaoodlent sqpport fioin may. 'The increment of" additional support, 
ilicf' need may be just as prawided by evolutionary changes to the current force striictnre as 
If creation of an dl new, snrvivabfe Tacsat afflcliitectnie. If the nation is ready to make a large 
innrasinKniinanewmilitaiy space capafelitf, perihaps prowdiig a highly responsive and, 
ieBaHe hunch system that would lower the cost of access to space by an onto of magnitude 
sliosiii, be our number one priority. That way, on-oriril sparing could 'become an, affixdable 
and oomriboie eflbctivd^ to realistic ndBtary stnttegjes.
II. Planning for a Multipolar World
The fiat-Weal; bipolar, ^bbal ;pliical, strnctme Aat has ptevaikd for the past, forty years 
is undeqBoiqg * saflDnig mdfcainiQi^ Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, but the dark 
threat "will, 'inilicl: wehacve lamed to liic seems to1 have brightened and transformed — perhaps 
bringpng new onpQKtunity. Nevertheless* human nature has not fundamentally changed. Nor 
hats an c^pdUble dhnsioa of scarce tesomces teen, a^ udicaiedL ffisiory has shown that 
where gp&s envinniiieiit are fimited and, human demand is great, pursuit of national, 
insoiriitf is coum to 'lailBe^ itle fionn of competition or conQicL
i axiomalic m m say that' 'tie future worid will be multipplar raAer
aocnslomDd. Boiuipi todq^i Jiiies 'will at times become advenariesL And, adversaries could 
become adfies. Mkxe nations wiH develop nuclear c^piibllly, and more will acquire access to1 
space.
IB lilis fciiire,, UJS. iiirillaif r Is seen as levertmg l& somedung like Elsenhower's
will oonstiinaB lie in town.
IB this wcdd» U5. senrioes would be cafled on to1 operate effectively under jpotly 
poaaflileL IffiEttiy mctioa 'to fiut<liangjhig pfifcal,. sHnations may be demanded*
.- To be tndy eflfective^ ilihoiigjl:, tap id!, dtef lof ment joint service units would have to deploy
imponible it (he recent fist, they are more plausible today.
Of come; such would require spodBe and dedicated help in aider to perfonn well,
pdmaqr reaaons are two*
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types of equipment, technological developments, and surprise movements will become of 
increasing importance for deterrence. Deterrence is our primary aim, and it deals in perception. 
Potential enemies must believe we are watching them — that they cannot surprise us. Then they 
will find it harder to attack at all.
At the same time, verification of treaty provisions and monitoring of a growing number of 
nuclear capable nations will be required. The bottom line is that in the future, information will, 
indeed, equate to power. It is apparent that information will become of increasing importance. 
And global, real time information will require more space systems, not less.
Secondly, rapid deployment of U.S. forces will need space support to coordinate their 
activities. Communications, global in coverage, secure in transmission, and available while on 
the move will be fundamental. Precise, reliable, global navigation will likewise fall into the 
mandatory category. Navigation, positioning, and targeting must relate to a common grid for 
accurate coordination, and allow for flexibility in determining new routes. Updated weather 
data enroute will be needed. Hours old reports simply will not be good enough. Current 
information on enemy disposition will also be necessary. Finally, real time, enroute threat 
warning will be needed to protect extended lines of communications.
As stated earlier, more spacefaring nations are bound to appear. Already we count China, 
Japan, India, Australia, Israel, and Iraq, along with the primary space group of the U.S., 
USSR, and Europe (ESA). Others will follow, and in a climate of shifting alliances, potential 
threats could emerge from surprising quarters. Furthermore, as the highest, most far-reaching 
arena for conflict, space will likely constitute the first campaign of the future, just as air 
superiority was (is) the first campaign up to the 1970s and 1980s. Now it may become 
necessary to gain space superiority before prosecuting terrestrial operations, just as it was 
previously necessary to gain air superiority before attacking by land.
All the above indicates that military space systems need to become more responsive, more 
directly accessible to terrestrial units, more pervasive, and more integrated into warfighting 
plans and doctrine. It also suggests that survivability must be taken more seriously. Although 
the sophisticated Soviet threat may be dwindling, a more diversified, albeit crude, threat could 
develop quickly. Finally, Space Control must be considered a prerequisite for other military 
operations.
III. Planning for the Inevitable
99.9% reliability equals 999 duds out of a million grenades; 
two landing errors per day at Los Angeles or New York; 20,000 
wrong medical prescriptions every year, unsafe drinking water 
one hour per month; and 2,000 lost articles of mail per hour, 
every day of every year.
- General Bernard Randolph
The next catastrophic failure of the Space Shuttle will occur between 1991 and 1993. That 
is, if the reliability of the Space Transportation System (STS) falls somewhere between 96% 
and 98.5%, and if the expected flight rate is accomplished on schedule, then enough flights 
wiE have been launched during that period as to mike an accident highly likely.
Of course, it is possible that the reliability figures quoted above fall well off the mark. If 
another 200 successive flights come off without failure, then the conclusion will certainly be 
much less sombre. But the STS is a 1960s technology machine, using components very similar 
to those used in other launch vehicles; and enough data has been collected on rocket powered
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boosters, both foreign and domestic, as to make reasonable allowance for variation. Therefore, 
it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the Shuttle will fail again during the mid-1990s.
At the same time, failure of a Titan IV is also likely by the mid-1990s. Space launch has not 
yet become routine.
The point of this paper, however, is not to debate statistical possibilities of failure. Rather, 
the point is to consider that the likelihood of failure in all current systems is high enough in the 
near future as to bring prudent men to contemplate what will happen when failures occur. What 
plans have we made for the inevitable?
Medium launch vehicles (MLVs) have a history of relatively short down times after a 
failure. All MLVs also have margin in their projected launch schedules. Therefore, when 
failures occur in this family, they should recover quickly, without leaving a backlog of 
grounded payloads. STS and Titan IV occupy the other end of the spectrum. When they fail 
next, repercussions will echo for years.
For Shuttle, several commentators have forecast that another failure could well bring a halt 
to the entire program. Certainly, if another failure occurs within 25 to 50 flights, it will be 
taken as evidence enough of unreliability as to cause the nation to consider whether 
continuation is worth it - whether the public will stand for regular tragedies and the 
accompanying mental anguish on a continuing and regular basis.
Beyond the human toll, at the current cost of an orbiter, along with the spacecraft it carries, 
we neeid to discover the system's true cost effectiveness. Can the nation afford to fly the STS if 
the cost of failure is included? We don't know - yet, because its unreliability remains 
unproven. But we should be prepared for the possibility that a failure in the next three years 
will peg it as too high a price to pay. Then what?
Certainly, in such a scenario, many payloads simply won't be launched. The current 
Shuttle manifest already lacks room for many commercial payloads, even though military use 
of the STS has dwindled to nearly zero. The current manifest, in fact, supports space station 
deployment flights above all else in the last half of the '90s. At the same time, NASA is 
recommending even more reliance on the STS. The Human Exploration Initiative to Moon and 
Mars, should it be approved, is entirely dependent upon a vastly increased launch capability - 
primarily Shuttle derived. That initiative would seem to be at risk from the start.
Could the nation simply turn to Shuttle C if failure of manned flights are temporarily 
interrupted? No, for it relies on the same economics as Shuttle. The cost of orbiters is simply 
too high to pay if they turn out to have lower than expected reliability. Other current 
expendables? The capacity of those systems, even with heavy investment in infrastructure, 
would fall woefully short of the required additional traffic flow ~ and man-rating would add 
enormous cost with questionable gain.
The truth is that the nation has not adequately allowed for an alternative to the Space 
Shuttle. When the inevitable happens, we will find no readily available option.
Similarly, when the first Titan IV fails, a parallel conclusion will become manifest. No 
recovery flight rate has been built into the Titan schedule. It has no designed-in resiliency. 
None of the currently planned Titan IV payloads has been able to provide for a backup launch 
capability on an alternate booster. So, when Titan fails, DOD will simply have to launch 
payloads late. Given that the current manifest is overbooked - that it already falls several 
payloads short by the turn of the century ~ the additional, accident-induced delay will bring 
with it a great deal of pain. This pain will be felt in terms of critical operational impact for DOD 
and its warfighters.
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Of course, the nation could develop alternatives. Let's look first at the Shuttle. Post-failure 
demands in the mid-1990s will require airplane-like reliability, a true abort capability, lower life 
cycle costs, and manned access. Until 1988, the National Aerospace Plane (NASP) program 
was on schedule to support a development decision by 1993, and it was aimed at meeting all 
these post-failure criteria. It still might. It could provide an elegant solution for an STS 
replacement, particularly if augmented by heavy lift expendables to assist with space 
construction and fueling. Economic analysis indicates that, since it is fully recoverable, it 
would more than pay for itself in under ten years. However, technological risks, particularly in 
the areas of propulsion and materials, have slowed its development.
For contingency planning purposes, however, we could follow a prudent path toward a 
lower technology version of NASP as a fallback in case of STS termination. Several 
alternatives have already been examined. We need only choose one, and bring the design work 
forward to the point where we could stand only production lead-time away.
Certain companies have examined their ability to build Single Stage To Orbit (SSTO) 
vehicles using current propulsion (SSME) and vertical ascent profiles which do not dictate use 
of exotic materials - thus avoiding the two primary areas of NASP technological risk. These 
companies have actually built sections of their design solutions. If design work was done in 
advance, we could stand at three years production lead-time away from first launch — about the 
same that is required to build a replacement STS.
Similarly, we could produce a small, manned vehicle and launch it from the back of an 
airplane. Tests of this sort were conducted with the orbiter. Pegasus offers another useful 
example. We even see the Soviets pursuing this as a low cost, low tech method of getting into 
the responsive, airplane-like, manned space vehicle arena during the 1990s. Complemented 
with unmanned, expendable flights to haul cargo, this solution could satify the need for 
keeping man involved in a half-completed space station should STS fail during the last half of 
the 1990s.
As for a Titan IV replacement, one obvious answer stands out - the Advanced Launch 
System (ALS). Titan is limited by its capacity (throughput), its old design and technology 
(1950s), its dangerous (both to humans and the environment) fuel (N2C>4 and UDMH), and its 
entrenched standard operating procedures. In this case, a new system is needed.
An ALS can be built with very low risk in technology, schedule, or cost. It would serve 
both NASA (planetary missions, moon flights, space station construction) and DOD (the entire 
Titan IV mission model plus room for both resiliency and growth). A new family of advanced 
launch vehicles would grow together using modular components. The first vehicle would be 
aimed at the heart of our known Eft shortfall and those firm, budgeted payloads in the 
foreseeable future. But new opportunities would be easily accomodated. As to economics, the 
higher a new launch system's flight rate, the quicker the amortation of its costs, but in no case 
for ALS would that fell more than ten years beyond its initial launch.
In summary, the nation will experience launch vehicle failures during the coming decade. 
Failures of both the Space Shuttle and Titan IV will be so painful as to call into question their 
continued viability. The nation will look for alternatives. It's up to us in the space business to 
ensure that reasonable options are available.
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IV. Planning to Invest
A. INVEST IN "THE FUTURE, NOT THE PAST
As described earlier, the United States faces a rapidly changing world in terms of national 
security policy. This change cames with it a profound shift in budgetary terms. Today, more 
than ever, the U.S. must be wary of preparing for the next war with the last one (the Cold 
War) in mind. We simply cannot afford it.
The theme of this panel, "DOD Space Operations: Capability for the War Fighting CINC," 
is meant to examine current DOD capability, highlight serious shortfalls, and prescribe 
requirements for the future. By focusing on shortfalls, an impression may be fostered that 
current systems are not serving warfighters well. But we must resist the temptation to patronize 
warfighting CINCs, prescribing for them new systems and architectures which they either do 
not want, which may not answer their needs, or which they may not be able to afford.
Certainly, geopolitical changes forseen will require more reliance on space systems than 
before. As the static confrontation of massed armies dissolves into a more fluid situation, 
global in scale, area CINCs must rely more on space for information and support. This is the 
situation this panel must address, not the old one we faced just last year. In a sense, the 
requirements we have gathered to date, although helpful in our work here, have been overcome 
by ongoing and unexpected change in the world situation.
B. ONE OPTION: INVEST IN INCREMENTAL VERSUS WHOLESALE CHANGE
In the first section of this paper, an argument was made against stating requirements for a 
launch system capable of surviving in a nuclear environment. This offers a perfect example of 
how recent change can effect our planning. We can all agree that the nuclear threat, while not 
totally banished, has been reduced by a significant degree. It would seem imprudent to deploy 
a nuclear survivable launch system in the face of such projections.
Likewise, with a lessening of tensions between the superpowers, a reduction in the 
sophistication of the space threat should be forecast. At the same time, the potential for co- 
orbital ASAT attack, while not necessarily increased, certainly has to be considered more 
diversified in terms of nations of origin. Today, the likelihood is greater of small scale, 
surprise attack against selected satellite targets. We may not need large scale proliferation in 
regard to the numbers of DOD space systems, ala Tacsat. On-orbit spares and other 
evolutionary changes may suffice. On-orbit spares would allow DOD to immediately rectify 
unexpected failures or combat losses. They would make constellations robust in terms of both 
capacity and survivability. They would allow for a steady buildup with level funding profiles. 
They would build on current infrastructure investment without requiring radical change. In 
short, on-orbit spares are a good idea for any military constellation, and they look particularly 
attractive in the future, changing environment.
C. JOINT FUNDING POSSIBILITIES
Besides survivability issues, DOD would also be well advised to think about joint funding 
possibilities. For instance, military systems might be developed in closer cooperation with 
NASA, attempting to solve national problems, not just DOD problems. If any portion of 
NASA's Human Exploration Initiative - flights to Moon and Mars - are approved, DOD 
should also benefit from advanced launch and orbital transfer capabilities that will have to be 
developed. On-orbit assembly and servicing may likewise hold benefits for DOD. So joint 
funding might better enable both agencies' programs to survive in a tough fiscal environment, 
while also ensuring enough excess capacity to ensure expanded military needs in times of 
conflict.
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D. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Another possibility is to consider that a lessening of tensions in today's world, offers an 
opportunity to take advantage of the breathing space to focus on technology. If we accept the 
notion that there is less overall danger to the United States today, and that we possess sufficient 
military capability, then perhaps there is room to rely on current systems longer without 
modernization. Maybe we can forego the next incremental change in certain systems and wait 
for technology developments to bring forth a generational leap. But our criteria should remain 
steadfast — cost effectiveness and operability must be delivered.
Certainly, it would be prudent to at least invest in focused technology development while 
pursuing incremental change. The idea would be to live within a constrained budget and meet 
the near term threat while devloping a capability to meet a more capable threat should that need 
arise. In other words, technology development should be used as part of a responsive strategy, 
reacting to both fiscal prudence as well as a realistic view of enemy capability.
E. STANDARDIZATION FOR ECONOMY
Current space systems, developed as high tech, one of a kind, R&D oriented programs, 
need to take on operational characteristics. Standardization is fundamental. This applies to 
systems, interfaces, procedures, training, logistics, and operations. Systems which are not 
standardized, should at least be interoperable. For example, all USAF satellites should accept 
commands from all USAF mission control centers. All operations should be made routine, 
simplified, and repeatable — which is to say, reliable and affordable.
If space systems were designed with these operational characteristics, they would come 
much closer to meeting two other fundamental goals: lowering costs and increasing 
responsiveness. The single greatest barrier to routine access to space today is the cost of getting 
there. This cost must come down. Similarly, the single greatest barrier to operating in space in 
full support of military war plans is the designed-in unresponsiveness of current sysems. 
Military space systems must "stand alert." Here again, standardization is fundamental. 
Uniqueness drives costs up. Standardization can bring them down.
F. THE CASE FOR ALS
In terms of specific advocacy, certain programs stand out as "enablers" for nearly every 
major change advocated. For example, Section I advocated launching on schedule at greatly 
reduced costs, Section II argued for more responsiveness in space systems as well as creating a 
surge capacity, and Section HI spoke of dire consequences which will follow the next failure of 
both STS and Titan IV. Taken together, these constitute powerful arguments for developing an 
Advanced Launch System. ALS would enable DOD to meet operational goals for space by 
lowering costs while increasing both responsiveness and reliability. It should be priority one.
G. SUMMARY
In planning an investment strategy for military space systems, we must anticipate future 
needs and avoid preparing for past conflicts. The future global security environment will most 
likely see the need for space systems increasing rather than diminishing. The nature of the 
threat, however, will likely be different, and this will call for careful approaches in space 
system acquisition.
Current space systems serve warfighters well, although they have shortcomings in terms of 
survivability, responsiveness, and cost. For most systems, we should therefore pursue a 
responsive investment strategy — making prudent, incremental changes to meet the near term 
threat, while investing in focused technology to meet a more challenging threat should our 
adversaries make that necessary.
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For other systems, however, incremental change may not be sufficient; or we may find an 
opportunity to leap forward in capability. Either of these situations may justify forgoing 
upgrades for certain systems, living longer with what we have, putting more effort in 
technology application, and leaping forward to new, expanded capabilities.
We should look for joint funding possibilities. The need for lower cost, higher capacity 
launch systems by both DOD and NASA was cited as an example. Joint development of on- 
orbit servicing and repair technologies may be another.
Certainly standardization and operability need to be pursued. Uniqueness in space systems 
has led to a lack of responsiveness and affordability in the pursuit of individually suboptimized 
spacecraft. It's time to reverse that situation.
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